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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
HAROLD C. FULLERt 
Plaintiff and Respondentt 
vs. 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH~ 
N.A., Executor of the Estate of Fae L. 
Fuller t De ceased, 
Def~ndant and Appellant .. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 9086 
The plaintiff in this action and his wife, Fae L .. Fuller~ 
had for some fifteen years been estranged~ and the plaintiff 
had sought in vain to obtain the consent of Mrs. Fuller to 
a divorce (Tr. p. 31, lines 5-9). In the summer of 1957 Mr. 
and Mrs. Fuller agreed tentatively to the terms of a di-
vorce, and they went to visit Mr. Frank E. Moss to discuss 
the obtaining of a divorce. Distribution of the property to 
be made in the divorce proceeding was agreed upon (Tr. 
p. 10_, lines 14·23). 
Pursuant to this Wlderstanding, Mr. Moss drafted a 
Complaint wb i ch, at the trial of this c aset was introduced 
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in evidence and designated as "Exhibit 5 t- and in this Com-
plaint he asked the court to award to Mrs. Fuller the prop-
erty at 105 ~'B~" Street, in Salt Lake City~ and pursuant to 
the dis cu ssio n and agreement of the parties in paragraph 6~ 
he asked the court to exonerate Mr. Fuller from paying any 
alimony after the apartment house at 1 OS ~'B '' Street had 
been paid for. 
~rhe Complaint as drafted asked the court to award 
to the plaintiff~ Mrs. Fuller, tb e sum of $40.00 per week 
for support and maintenance, and when the plaintiff eJt-
amined the prepared Complaint he refused to sign the 
waiver prepared by the attorney because it was his under-
standing that no fixed alimony would be asked for. He 
thereafter talked to Mrs. Fuller t and it was agreed between 
them that no fixed alimony would be asked for, and that 
she would simply trust bim to pay an amount necessary for 
her requirements in addition to her receiving the 11 B'" Street 
property (Tr~ p. 13,. lines 9-12). 
Subsequently Mr. Fuller was notified by Mr. Moss"s 
office to come in and sign papers pursuant to the divorce, 
and believing that a complete understanding was had, and 
that the signing of the papers was necessary for the con· 
summation of the divorce proceeding, he went to the office 
of Mr. Moss and was asked by his secretary to sign a deed 
pursuant to the request of Mr. Mossts secretary, but did not 
sign the waiver because the Complaint had not been 
amended as he understood it should have been (Tr. p .. 12, 
lines 27-30 and p. 13~ lines 1-18). Since Attorney Moss was 
not present he could not discuss with him the fact that he 
and Mrs .. Fuller had agreed to eliminate the fixed alimony 
request from the Complaint (Tr. p. 13 11 lines 19 ... 30). 
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Subsequent to the signing of the deed the parties agreed 
between themselves to postpone the divorce proceedings, 
and Mrs. Fuller advised Mr. Moss of this factt and on 
November 22, l957t Mr. Moss wrote a letter to Mr .. Fuller, 
which letter has been introduced in evidence and designated 
as '~Exhibit 7" in which Mr. Moss said: 
"'Your wife called this morning to say that she is 
willing to postpone any further action in the divorce 
proceedings until springtime because she knows that 
you will be having financial problems through the 
winter in the moving picture business .. 
She expressed con£ idence that you would con-
tinue to send her money for her support as you have 
been doingt and she is willing to postpone action 
so that your credit will reflect a part ownership in 
the equity of the apartment house. Consequentlyt 1 
will keep these papers on file until some time next 
spring. 
At your wifets suggestion I am enclosing state-
ment for the time and paper work done to date. 
Yours very truly.) 
MOSS & COWLEY 
By Is! Frank E .. Moss.'t 
Before the parties determined to resume the divorce 
and the property settlement the matter was interrupted by 
the untimely death of Mrs .. Fuller. At the time of the death 
of Mrs. Fuller the property at lOS .uBtt Street was held in 
joint tenancy between Mr. and Mrs .. Fuller.. The First 
Security Bank, having been duly appointed as the Admin-
istrator of the Estate of Mrs .. Fuller) contended that the 
deed executed pursuant to the divorce negotiations was a 
valid conveyance of the property.. The plaintiff herein 
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£ iled suit against the First Security Bank to quiet title to 
the property at 105 ',;B~' Streett contending that the deed 
was not a completed conveyance but was made pursuant to 
the contemplated divorce,. and was never intended to be an 
in tervi vos gift or conveyance to Mrs.. Fuller. The trial 
court held in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant ap-
peals. 
POINT I 
THE EXECUTION OF THE DEED WAS UN .. 
DERSTOOO BY BOTH PARTIES TO BE ONLY 
AN INCIDENT OF THE DIVORCE PROCEED .. 
INGS AND WAS,... NOT INTENDED TO BE A 
PRESENT CONVEYANCE OF THE PROP-
ERTY UNLESS THE DIVORCE PROCEED-
INGS WERE EFFECTED~ THE FINDINGS OF 
THE TRIAL COURT ARE SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE. 
The def en dan t appellant argues at great length that 
it was the intent of the parties that the property at 105 "B~ 
Street should be presently conveyed to Mrs .. Fuller in ordel' 
to provide income for her whether the divorce was con-
summated or not,. and much argument is made of the fact 
that Mrs .. Fuller actually collected the rents and paid the 
bills; however, the evidence is clear that Mrs .. Fuller col-
lected the rents and paid the bills prior to any divorce con-
templated, and that she had always collected the rents and 
handled the money on this property (Tr. p. 22~ lines 2-11). 
It is not di.fficult from the evidence to determine what the 
actual intent and understanding of the parties was. Mr .. 
Frank E. Moss, a cornpe tent and qualified attorney of many 
years ex perie nee would certainly not have prepared a Com-
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plaint asking that the property at lOS ~'B'' Street be awarded 
by the court to the plaintiff, Mrs. Fuller .. had the deed 
included as part of the property settlement contemplated 
in the divorce, been intended to be a present conveyance. 
lf the property had already been conveyed there would 
have been no purpose to ask the court for relief in this 
respect. Further~ it would be inconceivable that Mr. Moss 
would write the letter on November 22~ 1957, designated 
as '~Exhibit 7'"1 in the proceedings~ advising Mr r Fuller that 
Mrs. Fuller desired the divorce proceedings to be stayed 
until the following spring on condition that he continue to 
provide her with the support payments in order that his 
credit would reflect a one-half ownership in the property 
at lOS HB'' Street. Surely i£ this property had already been 
conveyed such a scheme would be a fraud upon Mr~ Fuller"s 
creditors, and it would be highly unlikely that a respected 
and responsible attorney would be a party to such a fraud. 
It is obvious from the letter of November 22 that the 
deed already deposited with the secretary of Mr. Moss was 
not intended to have any force and effect until the divorce 
had been consummated; and further, that Mr. Moss con-
sidered himself an escrow holder of these papers. Hence 
the language in the letter: 
... ~~she is willing to postpone action so that your 
credit will reflect a part ownership in the equity 
of the apartment house. Consequently1 I will keep 
these papers on file until some time next spring/' 
(Italics supplied). 
These papers referred not only to the deed, but to the Com-
plaint, waivert and other documents drafted by Mr. Moss 
pursuant to the divorce agreement, and it was certainly 
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should not have any force and effect until the following 
spring. This is further substantiated by the testimony of Mr. 
Moss'"s secretary,. Phyllis Porter, who testified that Mrs. 
Fuller called and asked that the papers be held in abeyance 
until the following spring (Tr4 p4 35, lines 27-30 i p. 35, 
lines 1-11). Mrs .. Porter further testified that the instruc-
tions she had were to keep the papers, including the deedt 
in the file and to deliver them to no one, including Mrs. 
FuHer (Tr~ p. 36~ lines 10-14) ~ 
Shortly after Mrs. Fuller had advised to hold every· 
thing in abeyance, Mr. Moss submitted a bill for the work 
done to date to Mr. FuHer, which was paid by him (Tr. p .. 
36, lines 15-20)~ The defendanfs own witnesst Mr~ Frank 
E .. Masst testified that when the initial papers pursuant to 
the divorce were draftedt and the deed had been signed by 
Mrs~ Fuller~ Mrs~ Fuller called and asked that the entire 
matter be held in abeyance! and that everything be held up 
until she called him again (Tr. p. S6t lines 27-30; p. 57J lines 
l-S). 
Mr. Moss further testified: 
"THE COURT: WelL is it your understanding 
from your conversation with these persons that this 
deed was executed as a part of this divorce proceed~ 
ing and settlement of her property rights in that 
divorce?· 
A. Well the two coincided, Judge, and I am sure 
that this deed grew out of this whole conv-ersation .. 
However~ I understand that he had executed the 
deed and given it to her for the property. 
THE COURT: For what reason? 
A.. Preparatory to the divorce. 
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THE COURT: I see. 
MR. HYDE: And in consideration of her agree-
ment to divorce him,. isnl't that true? 
A~ At least in partt yes/' (Tr .. p. 62! lines 25-30; 
p .. 63, lines 1-8) 
Hence~ it was clear both to the plaintiff and to the 
plaintiff~s attorney that the deed signed in the office of 
Mr .. Moss and held in the file as part of the divorce papers 
was not to be delivered or effective until the divorce was 
completed~ and that the deed was given, as Mr .. Moss testi-
fiedt in consideration at least in part for the divorce.. (Tr. 
p. 63t lines 3-8). 
It is elementary law that a deed is only effective if it 
ts signed with the intent of making conveyance to the 
grantee, and that if the deed is signed pursuant to a plan 
which is never consummated, then there is no valid con-
veyance and the title remains where it was prior to the 
execution of the deed .. 
In 16 American Jurisprudence~ p. 506t the text writer 
explains the legal effect of a delivery by a grantor to a 
third person of a deed to take effect on the happening of 
a contingency; Le.~ in this caset the completion of the di-
vorce proceedings~ 
"Section 12 3 ~ Conditional deli very to gran tee-
an instrument may be delivered in escrow to a third 
person to be kept by such third person until the 
performance of a condition or the happening of an 
event" which, on the performance of the condition or 
the happening of the contingency specified~ becomes 
operative as a deed and passes legal title .. ~' 
The court in this case made a specific finding that it 
was understood between the parties that all documents per-
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taining to the divorce proceedings~ including the deed 
executed by the plaintiff to the uBt' Street propertyJ would 
be held until the divorce was consummated (Tr .. p. 71.; par. 
4 of Findings of Fact). This finding of the trial court was 
impelled by the evidence of the witnesses called at the trial 
of this case. 
The plaintiff~ Harold C.. Fuller~ testified repeatedly 
that the only purpose he had in executing the deed was 
to complete the necessary papers for tbe obtaining of the 
divorce, and that it was never his intention that title to the 
property should pass until the divorce was obtained (Tr. pp. 
1 g and 20; p. 28, lines 2?-30; p. 30, lines 1-20).. Mr. Moss's 
secretary~ Phyllis Porter~ had been instructed to keep the 
deed with the rest of the divorce papers and not deliver 
them to anyone (Tr. p~ 36~ lines 7-14).. It was obviously the 
understanding of Mr. Moss~ the attorney for Mrs. Fuller, 
that the deed would be held in escrow in his office subject 
to the completion of the divorce proceedings because he did 
not record the deed. He asked for the award of the prop-
erty in his Complaint, which would have been a vain pleada 
ing had the property already been conveyed prior to the 
obtaining of the decree~ and he testified that the giving of 
the deed was at least in part the consideration for the di .. 
vorce. The court made special inquiry of Mr .. Moss as to 
whether or not the deed was part of the divorce proceed .. 
ingst and Mr. Moss testified as follows: 
"THE COURT= Well~ is it your understand ... 
ing from your conversation with these persons that 
this deed was executed as a part of this divorce 
proceeding and settlement of her property rights in 
that divorce? 
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A. Well the two coincidedt Judge~ and I am sure 
that this deed grew out of this whole conversation. 
However, I understand that he had executed the 
deed and given it to her for the property. 
THE COURT; For what reason? 
A. Preparatory to the divorcer 
THE COURT: I see. 
MR.. HYDE= And in consideration of her 
agreement to divorce bimt isntt that true? 
A. At least in part, yes." (Tr. p. 62,1ines 25-30; 
p. 63 ~ lines 1·8) 
The letter of November 22, 1957, designated as ""Exhibit 
rj is further evidence of both the understanding that Mr. 
Moss, the attorney for Mrs4 Fuller,. had and the under-
standing that Mrs~ Fuller had of the delivery of this deed 
into escrow; otherwiset there would have been no point in 
Mr. Moss stating that Mrs. Fuller was willing to postpone 
the action in order that the plaintiff•s credit would reflect 
the ownership in the apartment house.. Pursuant to the 
understanding of all partiest the deed was never delivered 
into the possession of the deceased, and hence upon the 
death of the deceased the title to the property passed to the 
other joint tenant, the plaintiff in this action. 
In the case of Phillips v4 Farmers Mut. F. Ins. Co., 175 
N4W. 144~ the grantor delivered a warranty deed into the 
hands of a broker for the purpose of effecting a sale of a 
property, the deed naming the broker as grantee4 The court 
held this delivery was a conditional delivery, and that no 
title passed thereby.. It can scarcely be imagined that if 
Mrs .. Fuller had renounced her agreement to seek the di· 
vorc.e that Mr .. Fuller would nonetheless have considered 
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the deed a present conveyance of the property which he 
had purchased and maintained for so many years .. 
In the case of Angell v. Ingtamm~ 213 Pac .. 2d, 944, it 
~as held that an a_ttempted delivery of an instrument placed 
in escrow by the escrow holder in violation of the terms 
of the escrow agreement, passed no title to the property 
to the grantee. 
We submit that if Mrs .. Porter or Mr. Moss had made 
a delivery of the deed to Mrs. Fuller prior to· the time the 
divorce was procured that the deed would have been in-
effectual to pass title. This problem need not be faced, 
however, since no delivery was ever- made by the escrow 
holder, and at the time of death of Mrs. Fuller the docu-
ments were still held in escrow pursuant to the understand-
ing and instructions of both parties .. 
The evidence clearly showsJ and the court so foundt 
that Mr. Moss was advised that the parties were going to 
proceed no further with tbe matter, whereupon Mr. Moss 
billed Mrr Fuller far the work done to date, and the bill 
was paid by the plaintifft Harold F. Fuller. The deed to 
the ":t:Bu Street property remained in the file and was not 
delivered to either party (Tr. P~ 72; par+ 6 of the Court's 
Findings of Fact). 
Following the death of Mrs .. Fuller, the deed delivered 
to Mr. Moss!s office was recorded. The defendant points 
to the fact that the plaintiff thereafter wrote to his daugh-
ter who was the sole benefic~ary under the will of Mrs. 
Fuller as if she was the owner of the property. What 
would any ordinary lay person assume without having con-
sulted with an attorney? The First Security Bank had 
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taken the property over as part of the estate and had doubt-
less advised him that the legal effect of the giving of the 
deed into escrow amounted to a legal conveyance. 
uQ. Now since the death of your wife, who has 
collected the rents? 
A. Well~ the bank has been collecting the rents, the 
Security Bank. 
Q.. Have you ever objected to the Bank collecting 
the rent? 
A.. I didn,.t know my legal rights in this until I 
talked to an attorney, my attorneyJ and naturally I 
let them use high-handed methods and go ahead and 
handle it and I didn~t know where I stood until I 
talked to Gordon.~J ( Tr. p. 25, lines 1-9) .. 
(Italics supplied). 
If the opinion of a lay person were the criterion of 
what legal effect the court should give the transaction .then 
the uncontradicted testimony as to what the daughter said 
to her father would be significant: 
"I told my daughter at the time it was a terrible thing 
to happen and she said, ~well, Dad, it is your prop-
erty. I don't want it;' t~ (Tr .. p. 25! lines 21-23). 
uShe said, 1Dad I don,t want this property.. It is 
your work. I don't want your home.',, (Tr. p. 25, 
lines 27-30). 
I submit that any lay person ~dvised by the bank that the 
title was lost to him under these circumstances would 
probably believe that it was until advised otherwise by an 
attorney and would doubtless have acted just as did this 
plaintift 
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The citations which the appellant uses to support its 
position are all cases without relevance to the facts of this 
case4 Gappmayer v. Wilkenson, 53 Utah 236., 117 P. 763 is 
a case where the delivery was absolute and unconditional. 
In the case before this court the deed was delivered as part 
of the documents to effect a divorce proceeding which was 
never completed and was discontinued at the request of the 
grantee named in the deed. One of the reasons given by 
the grantee herself and her lawyer for stopping the pro-
ceedings in this case was so that Mr. Fuller would retain 
his interest in this very real estate until the following year. 
(See Exhibit 7). (Tr. p. 35, lines 23-30). 
In this case it was obviously the intent o£ Mrs. Fuller, 
Mr~ Moss and Mr. Fuller that the delivery of the deed be 
effected to pass title only when the divorce was obtained. 
In none of the cases cited by appellant was there a 
conditional delivery into escrow as was the case here. In 
this case the deed was never given into the possession of 
the deceased,. but was held in the attorney"s files pursuant 
to agreement~ to be used only when and if the divorce was 
obtained.. In all the cases cited the deeds were delivered 
to the grantee or someone for the grantee with the intent 
that they take effect when delivered. We have no argu-
ment with the decision in White v. Hendley, 35 Cal. App4 
267~ 169 p. 710~ where land was conveyed in consideration 
for the grantee caring for the grantor. This case is not 
applicable to facts where a deed is delivered into escrow, 
not to take effect until the other papers are signed and 
the divorce completed. Every day thousands of deeds are 
delivered to attorneys~ banks, and escrow holders pursuant 
to a contemplated transaction~it would be a monstrous 
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result to hold that these deeds passed title and the grantee 
named therein became vested with title even though the 
transaction of which the deed was only a part did not go 
through. 
Counsel cites at page 32 of his brief the very distinction 
between this case and all the cases cited : 
u(7-9) as a general rule, a delivery of a deed 
must be absolute and unconditional, unless it is in 
escrow. Further it appears in {30) C.J.S. Title 
Escrows, p. 7' also 21 C.J Is .. ~ P· 873 note 96 P· 878 
note 31, a delivery in escrow may be made only to a 
third person not a party to the transaction, and there 
can be no such delivery to the grantee upon a con-
dition not expressed in the instrument/' (Appellant~s 
Brief~ p. 32). 
This language states the rule correctly. In our case 
the deed was not delivered to Mrs. Fuller although the 
parties were negotiating directly between themselves and 
it could have been had it been their intention to effect a 
present conveyance of the property. The deed was de-
livered to the attorney~s secretary, Mrs. Portert who was 
instructed to hold it with the other papers and to deliver it 
to no one-not even Mrs. Fuller. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN 
DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON NEW EVI-
DENCE ALLEGEDLY DISCOVERED AFTER 
THE TRIAL OF CASEr 
The defendant in its Brief argues that though acting 
diligently it was unable to discover certain new evidence 
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which would have resulted in a different ruling by the trial 
court. There is nothing set forth in the Affidavit upon 
which the Motion was made that would excuse the defend· 
ant from not discovering the alleged evidence prior to the 
trial of the case.. The defendant had ample time for dis .. 
covery and to examine and interrogate all witnesses hav-
ing any knowledge of the transactiont and his failure to do 
so would not permit him to reopen the case on the basis 
of Rule 59. Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro· 
cedure provides that the court in its discretion may order 
a. new trial for the reason that newly discovered evidence 
has been uncovered uwhich he could nott with reasonable 
· diligencet have discovered and produced at the trial.'' There 
is absolutely no showing of any reasonable diligence on the 
part of the defendant to dis cover the alleged evidence .. 
The alleged evidence is of two types: 
a) That the deed was actually delivered to Mrs .. Fuller 
on November 1.5, 1957. 
b) That on March 3~ 1958t the mortgage on the uB'l' 
Street property was increased and the money received was 
loaned to the son of Mr. and Mrs. Fuller. 
With reference to both alleged bits of evidencet there 
was no showing made to the court of a reasonable cause 
why the alleged evidence could not have been discovered 
in the ordinary pre-trial discovery and produced at the 
trial of the case. All of the witnesses who would have had 
knowledge of such information were produced and examined 
by both parties.. The alleged evidence that the deed had 
been delivered to Mrs. Fuller was certainly contrary to all 
of the evidence the witnesses produced both for the plain-
tiff and the defendant. Mrs. Phyllis Porter testified that 
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the documents were never at any time released from her 
file until after the death o£ Mrs. Fuller. An examination 
of the Affidavit in support of the Motion will show no valid 
grounds for the failure to produce the alleged evidence. 
In regard to the fact that the parties on March 3~ 1958~ 
obtained a mortgage on the property and that the money 
was loaned to their son) is a further indication that both 
parties considered as of that time that they jointly owned 
the property, and the alleged evidence that a note was given 
by the son to his mother prior to her death would certainly 
be inadmissible if offered to prove that the son considered 
the property belonged to his rnother. It would not make 
any difference what the son's opinion was, and there may 
have been many reasons for his giving a note to his mother 
which would be perfectly consistent with the view of the 
court that the property remained the property of both 
parties until the death of Mrs .. Fuller .. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE EXCLU-
SION OF EVIDENCE. SUCH EVIDENCE 
WOULD IN ANY EVENT HAVE MADE NO 
DIFFERENCE TO THE ULTIMATE DE· 
CISION IN THIS CASE. 
Counsel argues that the exclusion of the Fae L .. Fuller 
Will and the inventory were improperly e~cluded from the 
evidence.. It is submitted that any person making a Will 
would include in the Will the disposition of all their real 
and personal property which they owned a.t the time of the 
making of the Will, or which they anticipated receiving 
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thereaftert and this would certainly be no evidence of the 
status of the title as of the time of the death of the de~ 
cedent. Even had this been admitted~ it would have cer· 
tainly not influenced the decision of the court in this case. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is submitted that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Judgment in this case are £ ully supported by 
the evidence and that the court gave full c onsid era tion to 
the evidence presented and to tbe Motion of the defendant 
to grant a new trial~ and that the final decision in this case 
was correct .. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GORDON I. HYDE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
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